IS TIE USE OF HERBICIDES IN LIMITED WAR JUSTIFIED?
Limited warfare is bound to have long-range effects on noncombatants and the environment of the area of -aerations, in addition to the immediate effects of cmbat. Saturation bombing ad the usa of napalm can alter the local terrain and vegetation for years to come; clearing of large areas of farm or forest lands for roads, base camps, depots, etc., will make permanent or semipermanent alterations to the environment; thousands of refugees will be on the run suffering from starvation and disease, many The military use of herbicides in Vietnam continued for over eight years and was considered successful and in demand by tactical comanders. The short-term benefits were regarded as overweighing the risks such as accidental spray drift into rubber plantations or rice fields whch were in friendly hands. Longtern unwanted side effects seemed to be negligible. After all, once a decision has been made to fight a war much unpleasantness ensues and, compared to most weapons of war, herbicides score .. pretty high on a scale for humaneness. Obviously from the large variety of weapons available, herbicides are but one and not ptedcuinat.
Nevertheless the question of unknown long-tern, detrimental, envircrmtal effects persists, and within both the scientific and political comunities opinion is widely divided on the effective- Purple -50% n butyl ester 2,4-D, 30% n butyl ester 2,4,5-T, and 201 isobutyl ester 2,4,S-T Blue -cacodylic acid. 2 Orange is used for jungle defoliation; White for woody plants, Purple for general use, and Blue for grass and rice destruction. Piclorm is a picolinic acid, a somewhat selective, translocated pre-and post-emergence herbicide. "We are too ignorant of the interplay in ecological problems to know how-far-reaching and how long-lasting will be the changes in ecology brought about by the widespread spraying of herbicides in Vietnam. These changes may include immediate harm to people in the sprayed areas and may extend to serious and lasting damage to soil and agriculture -rendering more difficult South Vietnam's recovery finm war regardless of who is the 'victor."'111-This kind of criticism seemed to be more speculation and perverse hope than well-fotuded scientific analysis, considering the experience with U. S. agriculture over a period of almost 20 years.
To evaluate this kind of attack on the operation, the Armed "From a military viewpoint, the attempt to starve the Vict Cong can be expected to have little or no effect. What it can be expected to do is to add to the flow of refugees already far beyond t"' capacity of the program designed to care fo.
len."21
What Mr. Mayer seems to ignore is that the Viet Cong mWt spend considerable time in supplying themselves with food and if this becomes more and more difficult, they become less and less effective as a military force. The creation of refugees has some advantages because the refugees come under full control of the government once they are placed in a refugee camp. If they can be returned to their homes after a short refugee status, the government gains. If, however, refugee status becomes permanent, the probiem for the government escalates and the advantages diminish.
As described by Lt. Colonel Bass:
"In summary, the availability of foodstuffs bears a direct relationship to the extent to which an insurgent force can be effective. 2 6 Goodell, p. S 15032. 
